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COMMENTS
Further, to give full effect to the act, it should be interpreted
to supersede Civil Code article 2924 as to any promissory note
given in connection with a motor vehicle credit sale. So inter-
preted the act would protect the vendee against capitalized in-
terest in excess of the legal maximum and would seem to make
usury a real defense available against a holder in due course. 143
The question of usury in retail credit sales in Louisiana
may be summarized as follows. Louisiana has adopted the gen-
eral rule that usury statutes do not apply to credit sales. How-
ever, it is believed that "finance charge," the difference be-
tween cash sale price and credit sale price, is interest within
the contemplation of the Civil Code. If so, article 2924 limits
conventional interest to 8% per annum and this provision should
apply to credit sales. Vendee should be entitled to sue and re-
cover the interest paid if it was usurious. 14 4 If the interest
has been capitalized in a promissory note, there is no usury
regardless of the amount of interest capitalized. Practically,
this may mean vendee is protected only if he has not given a
promissory note for the unpaid balance. The Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act may be interpreted to supersede article 2924
as to notes issued in motor vehicle purchases. This act may
allow munificent interest rates, but in general it seems to offer
greater protection to consumers than the illusory protection of
article 2924.
Karl W. Cavanaugh
EXPROPRIATION-COMPENSABLE ITEMS
IN LOUISIANA
INTRODUCTION
The expansion of state-sponsored public improvement pro-
grams has increased the frequency with which the property
rights of individuals must yield to public interest.' An impinge-
natural obligation."
143. There is a conflict of authority whether usury is a real defense. Compare
In re Gerber's Estate, 337 Pa. 108, 9 A.2d 438 (1939) (no) with Employees
Loan Co. v. Templeton, 109 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (yes). Apparently
Louisiana has not passed on the question.
144. See LA. R.S. 9:3501 (1950).
1. State-sponsored public improvements are an inevitable result of an increas-
ing population and a concentration of population in urban areas. An example is
1964]
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ment on individual property rights by state action may take
the form of an exercise of the police power, of the power of
appropriation, or of the power of expropriation. 2 When an exer-
cise of the police power injures private property interests, the
individual property owner is without a remedy.3 The appro-
priation of land for local roads or levees along a navigable
stream entitles the landowner to an amount not in excess of
the assessed value for the prior year of the land actually used.
4
If the impingement of private property rights takes the form
of expropriation, article I, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion controls. It provides that "private property shall not be
taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just and
adequate compensation is paid."5
For purposes of article I, section 2, property is considered
afforded on a national scale by the current construction of an interstate high-
way system, necessitating expropriation of property in urban business and resi-
dential areas where highways were not contemplated a decade ago. Within Lou-
isiana, the construction of the Toledo Bend Dam project on the Sabine River
afforded on a national scale by the current construction of an interstate high-
public improvements.
2. The distinctions existing between these three powers are not always as
clear as the importance of the distinction merits. The general definition of these
three areas are as follows:
The police power is exercised to prevent violence and secure the comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state by preserving order in society. Property rights
are often injured in order that the police power be effective, but this does not
alter the nature of the power being exercised. An example of this is the pro-
hibition of a public nuisance, State v. Jackson, 152 La. 656, 94 So. 150 (1922) ;
or the operation of a zoning ordinance, Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97
So. 440 (1923).
The power of appropriation is exercised by the state when it uses a servitude
established by article 665 of the Civil Code. This article establishes servitudes
on shores of navigable streams for purposes of levees and roads. This is not an
expropriation of the land encumbered with such servitude, since the owner ac-
quired the land subject to the servitude. In theory, the state is merely exercising
a pre-existing right in the land, not acquiring and creating a new right. Peart
v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421, 12 So. 490 (1893).
The power of expropriation is that power by which the state acquires private
property for the purpose of constructing public improvements. Shreveport & A.
Ry. v. Hollingsworth, 42 La. Ann. 749, 7 So. 693 (1890).
3. Department of Highways v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 243 La. 564,
145 So. 2d 312 (1962) ; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S.&G. Ry., 167 La. 771, 120
So. 290 (1929); New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 111 La. 838,
35 So. 929 (1903), aff'd, 197 U.S. 453 (1905) ; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v.
Hart, 40 La. Ann. 474, 4 So. 215 (1888).
4. LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. For discussion of road and levee servitudes, see
Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 801 (1930);
Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956) ; Hebert v. T.
L. James & Co., 224 La. 498, 70 So. 2d 102 (1954) ; Board of Comm'rs v. Frank-
lin, 219 La. 859, 54 So.2d 125 (1951) ; Board of Comm'rs v. School Bd., 130
So. 2d 692 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
5. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this Con-
stitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public pur-
poses and after just and adequate compensation is paid."
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"taken" when the state acquires the right of ownership or one
of its recognized dismemberments. 6 Property is considered
"damaged" when exercise of the power of expropriation results
in diminution in the value of the property.' As used in article I,
section 2, "property" has no precise meaning: many items are
included within its definition, but a final, unalterable enumera-
tion is not established. Absence of such a closed classification
provides a desirable flexibility which insures that protection
can be afforded against new and different damages whenever
the courts consider such protection desirable. Although the con-
cept of property is flexible in Louisiana, it must as a minimum
standard encompass any "property" falling under the protection
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution.8 Interpretations of "property" un-
der the Louisiana Constitution have never been successfully
attacked under the fourteenth amendment, and it appears that
Louisiana courts give the same meaning to "property" under
both Constitutions." What now constitutes "property" under
article I, section 2, is best understood by comparison of those
items which the legislature or the courts have deemed com-
pensable in expropriation proceedings with those items deemed
not compensable.' 0
The legislature has discretion in determining what things
may be expropriated, compensation being due for those things
taken." Although "property" could embrace movables and im-
6. See Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939) ; 2 NicnoLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[1] (3d ed. 1950) ; Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisi-
ana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
7. Police Jury v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So. 2d 672 (1957); Texas Pipe
Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956) ; JAIIR, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 98 (1953); 4 NIc0OLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.2 (3d ed. 1950) ; 1 ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN C. IV (2d ed. 1953).
8. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9. See, e.g., Dep't of Highways v. Stoer, 133 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
10. This method of determining what constitutes "property" in article I, § 2,
does not necessarily furnish a dependable guide for the inclusion of new items.
Such inclusion is a matter of policy, to be worked out by the courts and legisla-
ture as conditions change. The policy involved is the extent to which the state
can destroy and damage individual interests for the public good without compen-
sating the individual. Therefore, items which are not now compensable because
they have not been included within the meaning of "property" in article I, § 2,
up to this time, such as business losses, may, at a later time be compensable, if
such losses become oppressive.
11. Theoretically, "property" can be given a definition which would be so
all-inclusive as to include every interest an individual could possess. This is illus-
trated by considering that "contract" rights are often referred to as "property"
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movables, the Louisiana legislature has provided for expropria-
tion and compensation for immovables only.12 However, im-
movables include tracts of land, buildings, trees, crops, fruits
not gathered, component parts of buildings, things which the
owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and
improvement, usufruct and use of immovable things, servitudes
on immovables estates, and actions for recovery of immovable
estates or entire successions. 13  It is therefore difficult to
imagine a situation, under the prevalent concept of govern-
mental power to construct public improvements, in which the
state need acquire anything more than immovables in order to
fulfill public purposes.
Although "taking" in expropriation proceedings is limited
to immovables, "damages" caused by the exercise of the power
of expropriation cannot be so limited if the constitutional right
to compensation is fully to protect individual interests. It is
more often the rule than the exception that individuals suffer
more from "damages" resulting from expropriation proceedings
than from the actual "taking" of property.1 4 The courts and
the legislature must determine which of these damaged inter-
ests will be compensable. In the process of determining which
interests are to be protected, the ambit of "property" becomes
defined. This Comment will attempt to determine what items
are considered as "property" for purposes of expropriation at
rights. The American Law Institute has perhaps gone further in defining "prop-
erty" than has any other attempt. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 5, 10 (1936).
"Section 5. The word 'interest' is used in this Restatement both generically to
include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities and dis-
tributively to mean any one of them." "Section 10. The word 'owner,' as it is
used in this Restatement, means the person who has one or more interests."
There is no objection to the American Law Institute giving "property" this broad
definition. However, such a broad definition is useless for practical purposes.
In the area of expropriation a more exact definition is needed since individuals
and the state must know the extent to which the state may acquire private inter-
ests for public purposes. Because the legislature is the arm of the sovereign which
exercises the power of expropriation, it can use any definition of property not
repugnant to Louisiana Constitution article I, § 2, provided of course it does not
contravene the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The Louisiana legislature has limited itself to the "taking" of im-
movables.
12. LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950) : "As used in this Part, the term 'property' means
immovable property, including servitudes."
13. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 462, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 (1870).
14. The distinction between "taking" and "damaging" must be kept in mind.
An example of a common situation in which "damages" cause greater loss to an
individual than an actual "taking" is the expropriation of land and buildings
within which a profitable business is conducted. The owner of the land and
buildings will receive the market value of the land and buildings "taken," but
nothing for the "damages" to his business, although the "damages" may reflect
a greater loss than the loss of the land and the buildings.
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the present time by determining which items are compensable
in Louisiana.
"TAKING" AND "DAMAGING"-GENERAL METHOD OF VALUATION
UNDER EACH
In general, when property is "taken" the measure of com-
pensation is the market value of the property -that is, the
price which would be agreed upon by a willing buyer and willing
seller.1 5 Therefore, comparable sales are the best evidence of
market value.16 Sales of other property to the condemnor are
not controlling, but may be considered. 7 If there are no com-
parable sales, expert testimony is used, and the land is valued
at its highest and best nonspeculative use.'8 Factors considered
in determining value are incomes received from the property,
reproduction and replacement cost of the buildings, and de-
preciation.' 9
Property is "damaged" if an expropriation proceeding di-
minishes its value. Therefore, the general method of valuing
damages considers the difference between the value of the prop-
rety immediately before and immediately after the expropria-
tion action. 20
15. Department of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So. 2d 35 (1962)
School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957) ;, Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
East End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66 So. 2d 327 (1953) Department of High-
ways v. Caillier, 157 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) see Comment, Expro-
priation-A Survey of Louisiana Law, 18 LA. L. REv. 509 (1958).
16. Department of Highways v. Cent. Realty, 238 La. 965, 117 So. 2d 261
(1960) ; Police Jury v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So. 2d 672 (1957) ; Shreveport
v. Herndon, 173 La. 144, 136 So. 297 (1931).
17. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Paternostro, 236 La. 223, 107 So. 2d 451
(1958) ; Department of Highways v. Caillier, 157 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963). Sales to the condemnor are not given the same weight as sales between
willing buyers and willing sellers because of the compulsion found in sales to
the condemnor.
18. Department of Highways v. D. H. Sanders Realty Co., 244 La. 934, 155
So. 2d 24 (1963) ; Department of Highways v. Hub Realty Co., 239 La. 154,
118 So. 2d 364 (1960) ; Louisiana v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So. 2d 97 (1958) ;
School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v.
Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956); Department of Highways v. Ferris,
227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955) ; Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La.
988, 77 So. 2d 881 (1955) ; Harrison v. Highway Comm'n, 191 La. 839, 186 So.
354 (1939).
19. Department of Highways v. Carmouche, 155 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963) Department of Highways v. Crockett, 151 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963) Department of Highways v. O'Neal, 150 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963). Expert testimony would relate primarily to the effects of these factors
on market value. The weight to be given any factor is in the discretion of the
court.
20. See Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 171, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956).
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"TAKING" OF OWNERSHIP
Lands and Buildings
If the state needs full ownership of a tract of land, with
or without buildings on it, the owner must be paid full and ade-
quate compensation before the property can be acquired by
the condemnor.21 However, if the landowner places improve-
ments on the property and has been warned not to do so by the
condemnor, the owner is not entitled to compensation for the
improvements. 22
Land with Trees and Crops Thereon
Although the Civil Code states that "standing crops .
and trees before they are cut down, are likewise immovable,
and are considered as part of the land to which they are at-
tached, ' ' 23 they are not consistently treated as part of the land
taken in expropriation proceedings. At times, both may be
treated as separate compensable items, depending on the owner-
ship of and condition of the trees and crops, and the nature of
the condemnor.
When land taken has trees thereon belonging to the land-
owner, trees will not be valued as a separate item but will be
considered only in determining the value of the land.2 4 There-
fore if the land's highest and best use is for farming purposes,
the existence of trees on the property should not augment the
value of the land. However, if the land's highest and best use
is for timber growing, the existence of trees on the property
should be an important factor in determining market value.
When there is a separate timber estate on the property, it should
21. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2. An exception to the requirement of prior compen-
sation is the "quick taking" procedure available to the Department of Highways.
Sabine River Authority v. Phares, 245 La. 534, 159 So.2d 144 (1963) ; Depart-
ment of Highways v. Bradford, 242 La. 1095, 141 So.2d 378 (1962).
22. Department of Highways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So. 2d 674 (1951).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 465 (1870) : "Standing crops and the fruits of trees
not gathered, and trees before they are cut down, are likewise inmmovable, and
are considered as part of the land to which they are attached. As soon as the
crop is cut, and the fruits gathered, or the trees cut down, although not yet
carried off, they are movables. If a part only of the crop be cut down, that
part only is movable."
24. Ibid., see Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So. 2d 881
(1955); Birttingham v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 167 La. 368, 119 So. 259 (1928)
Department of Highways v. Henderson, 138 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV.
161 (1963).
[Vol. XXIV
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be considered as a separate compensable item with the expro-
priation price for the trees going to the owner of the timber. 25
When crops belonging to the owner of land taken by a con-
demnor other than the highway department are destroyed, they
should be considered only in determining the value of the land
taken, and not as separate items.26 A statute provides for spe-
cial damages for crops when the condemnor is the highway
department.2 7 When the land's highest and best use is as farm
land, the statute should not affect the compensation otherwise
due; however, it may increase the compensation when the
highest and best use of the land with crops is not as farm land.28
Under some circumstances, trees are classified as crops and
receive the same protection. 29
Crops owned by the lessee of the property or by a third
person are considered as separate items in all cases, and the
expropriation price for the crops is paid to the lessee or third
person.30 Plants of all types which do not have their roots in
the ground, such as pot plants, are movables, and damages
caused by the necessity of moving them are not compensable.3 1
Land with Sand, Gravel, or other Minerals Beneath Surface
Land taken, under which there are sand and gravel deposits,
is valued as usual- that is, according to its highest and best
use.32 If such use is as farming land, the fact that sand and
25. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23
LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
26. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 465 (1870) ; Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Lou-
isiana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
27. LA. R.S. 48:218 (1950).
28. Ibid.; Department of Highways v. Henderson, 138 So. 2d 597 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962).
29. In Department of Highways v. Henderson, 138 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962), the question was whether trees which were part of the stock of a
nursery were "crops." The court held that the trees were in fact crops, and
extended the protection of LA. R.S. 48:218 to them. The court did not mention
the possibility of trees on tree farms being classified as "crops." However, the
tests used by the court in classifying the nursery stock as crops indicate that
trees on tree farms would also be classified as crops. "We are aware that this
constitutes an exception to the traditional definition of crops, as being harvested
annually, but in all other respects this nursery stock is the same as a crop. It
has been planted, cultivated, sprayed, and cared for like any other crop. It was
intended to be dug from the soil and sold." 138 So. 2d at 602.
30. De Moss v. Police Jury, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928). This result fol-
lows from the Louisiana jurisprudential rule that gives lessees ownership of the
standing crops which they have cultivated. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and
Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517 (1962).
31. Department of Highways v. Henderson, 138 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
32. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Broussard, 234 La. 751, 101 So. 2d 657
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gravel exist beneath the surface should not affect the value of
the property. However, if the value of the sand and gravel is
such as to cause the land's highest and best use to be for sand
or gravel mining, it will be valued accordingly. Valuation is
based on the testimony of sand and gravel contractors as to
the value they would pay for the right to mine the sand and
gravel; it is not based on the property's estimated sand or gravel
content
5
Land under which there is the possibility of oil and gas
would likewise be valued at its highest and best use. If the
possibility of oil and gas is strong enough, this possibility would
be considered by appraising the land as potential oil and gas
producing land. Except as otherwise provided by special stat-
utes, the condemnor would acquire all rights to future minerals
when full ownership of the land is taken since mineral rights
are real rights.
34
Land Previously Expropriated and Subject to Public Use
Property which has previously been expropriated and dedi-
cated to a public purpose is subject to re-expropriation.35 As a
general rule, compensation must be paid the first condemnor,
even though what is expropriated is already subject to public
use, since the thing expropriated was the private property of
the condemnor who had first paid for it.
Whether expropriated property subject to public use can be
re-expropriated depends on the character of the second con-
demnor. If the state itself, not acting through any agency or
corporation, is seeking to expropriate property, the fact that
(1958) ; E. Baton Rouge v. Ronaldson, 150 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
33. Department of Highways v. D. H. Sanders Realty Co., 244 La. 934, 155
So. 2d 24 (1963) ; R. Baton Rouge v. Ronaldson, 150 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).
34. Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939). See Yiannopoulos,
Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
Real rights are the rights of ownership and its recognized dismemberments. When
the state acquires full ownership of land, it acquires all real rights in the land,
including the mineral servitude.
When the land is encumbered with a mineral servitude, lease or royalty, the
state also acquires these real rights. However, the situation most commonly in-
volving these rights occurs on the taking of land for highway purposes through
rural estates. Since the whole of the mineral servitude, lease, or royalty is not
taken, the problem is considered in the text accompanying notes 142-147 infra,
which treats the "damaging" of real rights.
35. Department of Highways v. School Board, 242 La. 682, 138 So. 2d 109
(1962) ; Louisiana & N.W. Ry. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 112 La. 915, 36 So.
803 (1904) ; Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 49 La. Ann.
29, 21 So. 144 (1896).
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the property is already subject to a public use is immaterial.86
However, a corporation or state agency having the power to
expropriate private property cannot expropriate property al-
ready subject to public use unless the condemnor has special
legislative authority to acquire such property. 7
If part of previously expropriated property has never been
used for public purposes, that part may be expropriated as
though it were ordinary private property,3 8 and without special
legislative authority. 39 Except for special legislative authority
the normal rules governing expropriation apply to expropriation
of property already subject to a public use.40
The first condemnor who is a corporation such as a railroad
is not compensated for an increase in the expense of maintain-
ing property for purposes of public safety, caused by the second
expropriation. 41 If the company can prove damages resulting
from interference with the exclusive enjoyment and use of the
property by the presence of and use of the second condemnor,
the company will be compensated to that extent, even though
the damages are nominal.42 However, any property of a cor-
poration such as a railroad, which is located on the public
streets, is always subject to the police power, and loss resulting
from exercise of the police power is not compensable. 43
"TAKING" OF REAL RIGHTS OTHER THAN OWNERSHIP
Concession or Franchise
The civilian counterpart of "franchise" is "concession. '44
36. See note 35 supra.
37. See note 35 supra.
38. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 49 La. Ann. 29,
21 So. 144 (1896). See Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 125 La.
756, 51 So. 712 (1910).
39. See note 35 supra.
40. Louisiana & N.W. Ry. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 112 La. 915, 36 So. 803
(1904).
41. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 224 La. 279, 69 So. 2d
43 (1953) ; Shreveport v. Kansas City So. Ry., 193 La. 277, 1.90 So. 404 (1939).
42. Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 166 So. 471 (1936) ;
Shreveport v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 182 La. 36, 161 So. 12 (1935) Shreveport
v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 169 La. 1085, 126 So. 667 (1930); Eunice v.
Louisiana W. Ry., 135 La. 882, 66 So. 257 (1914).
43. Department of Highways v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 243 La. 564,
145 So. 2d 312 (1962) ; Shreveport v. Kansas City, Southern & G. Ry., 167 La.
771, 120 So. 290 (1929); New Orleans Gas-light Co. v. Drainage Comm., 111
La. 838, 35 So. 929 (1903), affd 197 U.S. 453 (1905) ; New Orleans Gas-light
Co. v. Hart, 40 La. Ann. 474, 4 So. 215 (1888).
A common example of this principle is found when a condemnor has placed
obstructions on a public street, and at a later date an increase in traffic causes
the obstructions to be dangerous to the health and safety of citizens.
44. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
1964]
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However, the Louisiana Constitution, statutes, and courts have
used the term franchise.45 In France there are two types of
concessions: one is a temporary permit to use the public domain;
the other is the grant of a monopoly in return for the under-
taking of a work of public utility.46 In Louisiana the same dis-
tinction exists between a mere privilege to use public property
for private purposes, and the grant of a franchise to use the
streets for purposes of a public utility.47 The latter grant may
be exclusive, non-exclusive, or revocable.
A concession to use public property for private purposes
is not "property" within the meaning of article I, section 2. It
is revocable at the will of the grantor, and damages suffered
because of its revocation are not compensable. 48
Non-exclusive and revocable franchises are not considered
"property" for expropriation purposes. Consequently, destruc-
tion of or diminution in value of such a franchise which results
from the grant of similar privileges to a competitor is not a
"taking" or "damaging" of property for which compensation is
due.49
An exclusive franchise, which gives the grantee a monopoly,
is "property" for purposes of expropriation.50 The "property"
consists of the monopoly privileges granted plus the use of prop-
erty necessary to exercise the privilege. This "property" cannot
be taken for public purposes without the payment of just and
adequate compensation." However, an exclusive franchise does
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 3092 (1959).
45. See Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d 24 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; LA. R.S. 12:65, 12:150,
12:303, 38:2332, 48:84 (1950).
46. 1 PLANIOL, CivIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 3092 (1959).
47. See Hutton v. Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So. 2d 665 (1950) ; Curtis
& Phelps v. Morehouse, 12 La. Ann. 649 (1857) ; Shepherd v. Third Municipality
of New Orleans, 6 Rob. 349 (La. 1844) ; Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 126 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied.
48. Hutton v. Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So. 2d 665 (1950) ; Shepherd v.
Third Municipality of New Orleans, 6 Rob. 349 (La. 1844). In the latter case
the defendant had allowed plaintiff to construct certain structures over a street
to expedite plaintiff's business.
49. Curtis & Phelps v. Morehouse, 12 La. Ann. 649 (1857). See Hutton v.
Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So. 2d 665 (1950) for an example of such a
franchise.
50. An example of a monopoly franchise is the franchise granted by a munici-
pality to a private electric company in order to furnish electricity to the citizens
of the municipality. See Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d
24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, for an example of the expropriation
of such a franchise.
51. Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1st
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not give the grantee the right to use any particular property.5 2
Therefore, the state may require the grantee of a franchise to
relocate any structures, erected pursuant to the exercise of the
franchise, without payment of compensation. 3 This is justi-
fied on the principle that the state's action is an exercise of the
police power. 54
Franchises authorizing the performance of acts injurious
to the public health, safety, or morals are revocable at the will
of the state, and the grantee is not entitled to compensation
therefor.55 However, the state may not take without compensa-
tion the corporeal property of the grantee used in the exercise
of the franchise. Such property is protected to the same extent
as any other property.58
Predial Servitude
Any type of predial servitude may be expropriated by the
state.5 7 Those actually acquired include rights of way,58 tem-
porary servitudes for access to other property during construc-
tion periods, 59 and temporary servitudes for borrow pit pur-
poses.6
Cir. 1960), cert. denied; see also Department of Highways v. Southwestern Elec.
Power Co., 243 La. 564, 145 So. 2d 312 (1962).
52. Department of Highways v. Southwestern Elee. Power Co., 243 La. 564,
145 So.2d 312 (1962).
53. Ibid.
54. Department of Highways v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 243 La. 564,
145 So. 2d 312 (1962). It is an imperfect right held subject to the paramount
right of the state to require the removal of the facilities under police power. New
Orleans Gas-light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 111 La. 838, 35 So. 929 (1903), aff'd
197 U.S. 453 (1905).
55. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.75[3] (3d ed. 1950).
56. Ibid.
57. It was established early that the condemnor was entitled only to the
rights needed to accomplish his purpose. If a servitude is sufficient he can ex-
propriate only a servitude. If the landowner pleads that only a servitude is
needed, the condemnor must prove that full ownership is needed. However, if
the landowner does not so plead, and the condemnor acquires full ownership, the
landowner cannot thereafter complain. Knox v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 157
La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925).
58. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. East End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66 So. 2d
327 (1953) ; Knox v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925) ;
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
59. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Babineaux, 154 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963). When a temporary servitude or use of property for construction purposes
is taken, the landowner is entitled, at most, to a fair rental for the period of
occupancy. Louisville & N. R.R. v. R.E.E. De Montluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116
So. 854 (1928). If the need for the use of heavy machinery occurred, the rights
of ingress and egress, which are inherent in the case of the servitude granted,
would authorize the condemnor to enter upon and use additional necessary areas,
subject to the right of the landowner to claim damages. Texas E. Transmission v.
Terzio, 138 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
60. See text at notes 67-69 infra.
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The landowner is entitled to the value of the servitude taken
plus damages suffered by his remaining property.6 1 In most
instances the value of the servitude taken is less than the mar-
ket value of the property encumbered by the servitude, since
the ownership rights are of some value to the landowner.62 How-
ever, the condemnor's use of the servitude may so interfere with
the landowner's use of the surface that compensation for the
servitude will equal the market value of the land.6 3 Damages
suffered by the landowner because of the presence of the servi-
tude on his property are not separately compensable, but are
considered in arriving at the true value of the land taken.6 4
There is a statutory exception to this rule in cases in which
the Department of Highways acquires a servitude for highway
purposes across land upon which there is a growing crop.65
When crops or timber owned by a person other than the land-
owner are destroyed by the taking of a servitude, the owners
of the crops or timber should be entitled to compensation. 66
Acquiring sand or gravel for public improvements can be
accomplished by "taking" the land in full ownership. The De-
partment of Highways, however, may acquire sand and gravel
by expropriation of a temporary servitude for borrow pit pur-
poses. 67 This procedure may become more prevalent as a result
of the current increase in highway construction, requiring the
use of increasingly large amounts of sand and gravel. Once
61. Damages to the remaining property when only part of the property has
been taken by expropriation are called severance damages. These are considered
in the text at notes 70-72 infra.
62. For example, the court allowed 75% of the value of one section of prop-
erty and 60% of another as the value of a servitude, since the surface area would
have some value as parking space, lawns, play areas, and gardens in Colonial
Pipe Line Co. v. Babineaux, 154 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
63. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So. 2d 251
(1956), 110,000 volt electric transmission lines were constructed on a servitude,
all the trees were cut down, and no trees or crops could be grown on the surface.
The court held that, for all practical purposes, the value of the servitude equalled
the value of the fee. See also Department of Highways v. Hayward, 243 La.
1036, 150 So. 2d 6 (1963); Port Comm'n v. Morley, 232 La. 87, 93 So. 2d 912
(1957) ; Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So. 2d 881 (1955)
Department of Highways v. Lumpkin, 147 So.2d 80 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
64. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Broussard, 234 La. 751, 101 So. 2d 657
(1958).
65. LA. R.S. 48:218 (1950). See text at notes 26-29 supra for a fuller dis-
cussion of this statute.
66. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517 (1962) for a discussion of the status of such crops.
67. LA. R.S. 48:222 (1950) ; Department of Highways v. Hayward, 243 La.
1036, 150 So. 2d 6 (1963) ; Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988,
77 So.2d 881 (1955) ; Department of Highways v. Lumpkin, 147 So.2d 80 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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the Highway Department has taken the required sand and
gravel, there is no further need for state occupancy of the
property. Consequently, full possession can be returned to the
landowner 5  Since the land encumbered with such a servitude
is of little practical use to the owner after the Highway Depart-
ment has taken the sand and gravel, the owner generally re-
ceives the full market value of the land when the servitude is
taken. 69
"Damaging" of an Immovable
Severance Damages
If only part of a tract of land is taken for public purposes,
the value of the remainder is usually diminished. It is well
settled that the landowner is entitled to compensation for this
decrease in value.70 In Louisiana such damages are taken into
consideration by compensating the landowner for the difference
between the value of the tract of land immediately before and
immediately after the taking.71 Any benefits accruing to the
land because of the location of the public improvement may be
used as a set-off to the extent of the severance damages.72
Change of Grade
The necessary cost of changes and alterations of improve-
ments on the premises in order to preserve the same and to
conform to a new street grade is a compensable item.73 Com-
68. Actually, full ownership never left the owner. He retained all rights in
the land when the temporary servitude was "taken," except for the one real right
(servitude) taken. Once the servitude served the purpose it was taken for, it
expired and the land was no longer encumbered.
69. Department of Highways v. Hayward, 243 La. 1036, 150 So. 2d 6 (1963)
Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226 La. 988, 77 So. 2d 881 (1955) ; Depart-
ment of Highways v. Lumpkin, 147 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). The
fact that the landowner receives the fair market value of the land encumbered
with the temporary servitude for borrow pit purposes may not appear to the
landowner as the fairest solution in all cases. In some instances the value of
the sand and gravel removed from the land, calculated at a certain price per
cubic yard, exceeds the fair market value of the land. The landowner will never-
theless receive the lesser amount.
70. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956) ; Lou-
isiana Highway Comm'n v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933) ; McMahon
v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Colonial
Pipe Line Co. v. Babineaux, 154 So.2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). See Com-
ment, Expropriation- Consequential Damage Under the Constitution, 19 La. L
REV. 491 (1959).
71. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956).
72. Highway Comm'n v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
73. Cerniglia v. New Orleans, 234 La. 730, 101 So. 2d 218 (1958) ; Cucurullo
v. New Orleans, 229 La. 463, 86 So. 2d 103 (1956) ; Manning v. Shreveport, 119
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pensation is given for this item because the interest a land-
owner has in the relation existing between his property and the
street has been classified as a "property" interest for purposes
of article I, section 2. 7 4  The right to compensation exists
whether any property has been taken from the owner or not, as
it is an award for "damages" under article I, section 2.
7 5
Once a street grade is legally established, the owner of land
abutting the street will not be compensated for damages, caused
by the change of grade, to improvements placed on the land
subsequent to the establishment of the new grade but prior to
the actual change of grade.76 Nor is the landowner entitled to
compensation if a grade change leaves the land burdened with
problems similar to those existing prior to the grade change.
77
Access to a Public Street
A landowner's means of ingress and egress upon an adjoin-
ing street have been recognized as property rights in Louisiana. 78
Therefore, damaging of ingress and egress rights upon a public
street by expropriation must be accompanied by compensation.7 9
However, the state, in the exercise of its police power, may
control the location of the places of ingress and egress upon
the land without damaging ingress and egress rights and with-
out paying compensation.80 Temporary interference with access
to a public highway or street causing diminution in the value
of the land should entitle the owner to compensation, under the
theory that the "property" right of ingress and egress has been
"damaged.""'
La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907) (leading case) ; Carter v. Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d
159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
74. Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907).
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid. If the new grade is not established for such a length of time as to
cause the new grade to be abandoned, damages to the premises caused by a
subsequent change are compensable.
77. Thomas & Warner, Inc. v. New Orleans, 230 La. 1024, 89 So. 2d 885
(1956). Grade changed from incline to decline, leaving the landowner with the
necessity of going downstairs to enter the property instead of going upstairs, as
he had to do prior to the change in grade.
78. Efurd v. Shreveport, 235 La. 555, 105 So. 2d 219 (1958) ; Department of
Highways v. Dowling, 205 La. 1061, 18 So. 2d 616 (1944) ; Gebelin v. Depart-
ment of Highways, 200 La. 409, 8 So. 2d 71 (1942) ; Harrison v. Highway
Comm'n, 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942) ; Jones Island Realty Co. v. Midden-
dorf, 191 La. 456, 185 So. 881 (1939) ; Department of Highways v. Lewis, 142
So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
79. See note 78 supra.
80. Department of Highways v. Dowling, 205 La. 1061, 18 So. 2d 616 (1944)
Gebelin v. Department of Highways, 200 La. 409, 8 So. 2d 71 (1942).
81. This result is a logical extension of the allowance of compensation for the
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The right to ingress and egress upon land is protected under
article I, section 2, only in respect to access upon public streets.
Thus when access to property is other than upon a public street,
and there is no servitude of passage involved, any damaging
of this access does not entitle the landowner to compensation,
even though the interference results in diminution of the value
of the land.8 2
Trees and Crops
When land is "taken" with trees and crops located thereon,
such trees and crops are considered as having been "taken"
with the land.8A However, in many instances trees in or along
expropriated land are not destroyed but merely damaged, as
when an electric public utility company expropriates a right of
way for electric power lines and trims trees along the route. 4
In these instances, the esthetic value of the trees will be con-
sidered. Thus when a tree has been carefully planted, arranged,
and groomed so as to evidence special esthetic value, the com-
pensation award will not be based on the value of the tree as
such, but on its intrinsic value.8 5 But when trees have grown
naturally and have no especially significant beauty, a nominal
award only is allowed.8 6
"taking" of the "property" right of access upon public streets. The "damaging"
of access would be compensable only when it results in a diminution of the value
of the land, and only to the extent of such diminution. See McMahon v. St. Louis,
Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Carter v. Louisiana High-
way Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). Personal inconveniences
and business losses resulting from "damaging" of access rights upon public
streets would not be compensable because those items are not normally com-
penable. See text at notes 164-179 infra. But see Sholars v. Louisiana Highway
Comm'n, 6 So.2d 153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). "[I]t is settled beyond debate
that temporary interference with property rights or the rendering for a time use
of property more inconvenient, when done for public purposes, do not amount to
a 'taking' and loss resulting therefrom does not fall within the 'or damaged'
organic provision. Sacrifices of this character are due by all property owners for
the benefit of the general public." Id. at 155. Although the quotation appears
as directly contradictory to the statement in the text, the quotation refers to
business losses, which are never compensable.
82. Burns Ice Factory v. Department of Highways, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d
74 (1958). Plaintiff's ice factory was located on a canal which led to the Gulf
of Mexico. The factory was used almost exclusively for the purpose of making
and selling ice to shrimp boats operating in the Gulf. The Department of High-
ways constructed a low bridge over the canal, completely cutting off all access;
to the Gulf by shrimp boats. This resulted in plaintiff's ice factory being ren-
dered virtually worthless. After finding that no servitude of passage existed, the
court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the destruction
of access to his property, since it was not on a public street.
83. See text at notes 23-31 supra.
84. As an example see Morgan v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 112 So. 2d
315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
85. Ibid.
86. New Orleans v. Shreveport Oil Co., 170 La. 432, 128 So. 35 (1930);
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Torts of the Condemnor's Employees Which Damage Property
Until 1948 damages to property caused by torts of the con-
demnor's employees engaged in work pursuant to expropriation
proceedings were recovered through an expropriation action
under article I, section 2.87 Then in Angelle v. State"5 the pre-
vious rule was expressly overruled; the Supreme Court held
that recovery under article I, section 2, was possible only when
the damages occurred as a necessary consequence of a public
undertaking.8 9 Therefore, damages caused by tortious acts of
the condemnor's employees were excluded and could be recov-
ered only in a separate tort action. In 1958 doubt was cast on
the Angelle ruling in Buras Ice Factory v. Department of High-
ways,90 which held that damages to property could be recovered
under article I, section 2, if the property were injured in a
manner that would give rise to an action under Civil Code
articles 231591 and 66792 for damages done by an individual or
private corporation. The Buras case may indicate that the Su-
preme Court has returned to its former rule.93
Whether recovery for this type damage is by a tort action
or by an expropriation action is important procedurally. If a
separate tort action is required, the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity will apply and legislative permission to sue the state
will be required . 4 Such permission is not required in expro-
priation actions.95 Also, the measure of damages varies in the
Tissot v. Great So. Tel. & Tel. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996, 3 So. 261 (1887) ; Morgan
v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 112 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Kerr
v. Cent. Louisiana Elec. Co., 59 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) Goins v.
Beauregard Elec. Co-ops., Inc., 44 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) Davis v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 13 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943); Marbury v.
Highway Comm'n, 153 So. 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
87. De Moss v. Police Jury, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928). The condemnor's
employees tore down a fence which protected crops from cattle. The fence was not
replaced, and cattle entered the field, destroying the crop. The Supreme Court
allowed recovery. See Comment, Expropriation - Consequential Damages Under
the Constitution, 19 LA. L. REv. 491 (1959).
88. 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
89. Ibid.
90. 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d 74 (1958).
91. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2315 (1870): "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it . . . . "
92. Id. art. 667: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to
him."
93. Buras Ice Factory v. Department of Highways, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d
74 (1958).
94. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 9 LA. L. REv. 224 (1949).
95. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
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two actions. In tort actions it is the cost of restoration and
the value of the lost use; while in expropriation actions it is
measured by the difference in the market value of the property
immediately before and immediately after the taking and
damagingf6
The argument has been advanced that such damages should
be recoverable in a tort action because otherwise judicial ex-
propriation proceedings required by the Constitution are a use-
less formality.07 Also, recovery in an expropriation suit would
deprive the landowner of the additional compensation he would
be entitled to in the tort actionY8 However, recovery in a sep-
arate tort action is criticized because of the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.9
It would seem that recovery of such damages in a separate
tort action is the better method, for the reasons suggested and
for the additional reason that article I, section 2, by its terms,
would seem to preclude recovery of such damages in an ex-
propriation suit. However, the effect of the Buras case upon
the Angelle case, and the status of such damages, will not be
known until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to re-examine
this issue.
Speculative Damages and Damages Affecting the
Public in General
Since damages to property are measured by the difference
between the value of the property immediately before and im-
mediately after the taking, speculative damages 1°0 to the re-
mainder will not be compensated, when part of a tract of land
is taken, unless the speculative damages decrease the value of
the property immediately after the taking.10 1 Therefore, diminu-
96. Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
97. Belgarde v. Natchitoches, 156 So.2d 132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
98. Ibid.
99. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 9 LA. L. REv. 224 (1949).
100. "Speculative damages" are those damages which may occur in the future
as a result of the public improvement being built.
101. New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So. 2d 349 (1959) ; Lafayette
v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So. 2d 672 (1957) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe,
229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956); Department of Highways v. Glassell, 226
La. 988, 77 So. 2d 881 (1955) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Nat'l Gasoline Co., 203
La. 787, 14 So. 2d 636 (1943); Highway Comm'n v. Lasseigne, 177 La. 440,
148 So. 672 (1933); Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Teissier, 134 La. 958, 64 So. 866
(1914); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Babineaux, 154 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963) ; United Gas Pipeline Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 156 So. 2d 297
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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tion in value of land caused by fear that the location of a public
improvement will result in future damages is compensable.
10 2
However, fear of future damages, likely to result from the loca-
tion of the public improvement, which does not lower the value
of the land, does not entitle the landowner to compensation. 0 3
Damages which are not special to the property in question
but which affect the public in general are not compensable. 10 4
These damages include diversion of traffic, narrowing of streets,
loss of corner influence and loss of street parking.0 5 However,
if the diversion of traffic or narrowing of the street interferes
with the means of ingress and egress, the property owner will
be entitled to compensation. 0 6
Damages to Property of a Third Person, no Part of Which
Has Been Taken
Article I, section 2, does not limit damages to those suffered
by property which has been partly taken. That a public im-
provement necessitates the taking of a part of one tract of land
while missing a neighboring tract by inches should not pre-
clude the owner of the latter tract from recovering damages for
the diminution in value of his land resulting from the expro-
priation.0 7 This principle has been followed in cases involving
obstruction of ingress and egress upon public streets10 8
102. An example is land expropriated for a pipe line. The fear of future
explosion of the pipeline is so great that the value of the land is diminished. The
reduction in value is compensable. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191,
85 So. 2d 260 (1956) ; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co.,
156 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Babineaux,
154 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
103. An example occurs when land is expropriated for railroad purposes. The
fear that use of the land will cause future damages does not reduce the value of
the remaining land, so compensation is not allowed. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Teis-
sier, 134 La. 958, 64 So. 866 (1914).
104. Efurd v. Shreveport, 235 La. 555, 105 So. 2d 919 (1958); Cerniglio v.
New Orleans, 234 La. 730, 101 So. 2d 218 (1958); Thomas & Warner, Inc. v.
New Orleans, 230 La. 1024, 89 So. 2d 885 (1956) ; Rudolph Ramelli, Inc. v. New
Orleans, 223 La. 703, 66 So. 2d 617 (1953) ; Patin v. New Orleans, 223 La. 703,
66 So. 2d 617 (1953); Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955) ; Jarnagin v. Highway Comm'n, 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
105. See note 104 supra.
106. Harrison v. Highway Comm'n, 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942) ; State
v. Lewis, 142 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
107. Jarnagin v. Highway Comm'n, 5 So. 2d 660, 664 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942) : "We are of the opinion that a physical invasion of real property or of a
real right is not indispensable to the infliction of damages within the meaning
of the constitutional guaranty under discussion. If the public improvement, as a
consequential effect, has caused special damages to property, such as is not sus-
tained by the public or the neighborhood generally, whether it abuts the improve-
ment or not, an action lies to recover." See Comment, 19 LA. L. REv. 491 (1959).
108. Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907).
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The possibility of recovering other damages suffered by
property a part of which has not been taken is considered in
the Buras case, 10 9 where the Supreme Court held that com-
pensation could be recovered under article I, section 2, only
when the public improvement "is of such a nature as would
give rise to an action in damages under 2315 and 667 of the
Civil Code had it been done by an individual or private corpora-
tion."110 It thus seems that the Buras case has limited the re-
covery of damages suffered by property, no part of which has
been taken,"' to those situations where the public improvement
is a nuisance"12 or otherwise involves a tortious interference with
the landowner's rights. This limitation is severe, especially in
view of the broadening concept of property. The concept of
"damages" in article I, section 2, would not be strained by the
inclusion of damages to property not actually taken if these
damages actually diminish the value of the property. Allowance
of such damages, however, is of necessity a matter of policy,
and it is the duty of the legislature and courts to decide at what
point the public interest in inexpensive public improvements
overrides the individual interest of being free from state action
which interferes with and damages private property.
"Damaging" of a Movable
Because movables cannot be "taken" by the state in expro-
priation actions, the owner must remove them from the ex-
propriated property. Any damages to movables incurred as a
result of an expropriation and the necessity of moving them
are not compensable, as such damages are considered consequen-
tial. 1 3 The cost of moving the movables is likewise not recov-
erable.1 4
109. Buras Ice Factory v. Department of Highways, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d
74 (1958).
110. Id. at 179, 103 So. 2d at 82.
111. See text at notes 87-99 supra, for a discussion of the possibility of re-
covering tort damages under article I, § 2.
112. See Schneiday v. Highway Comm'n, 206 La. 754, 20 So. 2d 14 (1944).
Damages caused by the nuisance must impair the value of the adjacent land before
compensation is awarded. The fact that it is a nuisance to an occupant of the
land is not significant.
113. Department of Highways v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So. 2d 97 (1958)
School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957) ; Department of Highways
v. Henderson, 138 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The legislature has limited
the property that can be "taken" to immovables. LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950).
114. See note 113 8upra.
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"Damaging" of Real Rights Other Than Ownership
Predial Servitude
If property encumbered by a pre-existing servitude is ac-
quired by expropriation, and the servitude is destroyed, the
owner of the dominant estate is entitled to compensation. 11
The servitudes most commonly destroyed by the exercise of the
power of expropriation are those of drain, passage, light, and
view. A temporary interference with a servitude should entitle
the owner of the dominant estate to compensation, if such inter-
ference diminishes the value of the dominant estate.116 In some
circumstances there may be a second concurrent use of a servi-
tude which does not interfere with or damage the first use, in
which case the first user of the servitude is not entitled to com-
pensation. The owner of the property would be entitled to no
compensation for the second use.11 7 It seems that the above
rules apply whether the existing servitude arose from the
natural situation of the place, from contract between the owners
of the property, or from a previous expropriation.
When a servitude of drain has been destroyed, and the con-
demnor does not restore it,1 1 8 the owner of the dominant estate
is entitled to the reasonable cost of repairing the damage, upon
the principle that the owner should be put in as good a pecuniary
position as if the property had not been taken. 119 A temporary
interference with a servitude of drain which causes a diminution
in value of the dominant estate should be compensable to the
extent of the diminished value. In some circumstances the inter-
ference with the servitude of drain may be so severe as to cause
115. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of Highways, 104 So. 2d 204
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1958), in which the court stated that the principle that a
right of way, whether called an easement or servitude, is property and that dam-
age to its free use by the owners thereof amounts to a taking of property, is too
well established to admit of question. The taking of a servitude entitles the
owner to compensation. Department of Highways v. Caldwell Bros. Real Estate,
Inc., 155 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
Department of Highways, 142 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
116. Boudreaux v. Landry, 120 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). The
result is logical. A servitude is an immovable real right, and damage to it which
diminishes the value of the dominant estate should be compensable to the extent
of the diminished value.
117. Servitudes are strictly construed. See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
E. End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66 So. 2d 327 (1953) ; Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Dileo, 79 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
118. In most instances the Highway Department restores the servitude of
drain. See Highway Comm'n v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932).
119. Department of Highways v. Caldwell Bros. Real Estate, Inc., 155 So. 2d
231 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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the property to be "taken," in which case just and adequate
compensation must be paid.1
20
A servitude of passage which has arisen by contract between
property owners will be strictly construed. 1 21 When such a servi-
tude of passage is merely temporarily interfered with by the
exercise of the power of expropriation, and the value of the dom-
inant estate is not diminished, there is no "taking" or "damag-
ing" of property which requires prior judicial sanction and
compensation. 122
A servitude of passage is discontinuous 12 and, with the pos-
sible exception noted below, can be established only by title.1 2 4
Therefore, when access to land is not established by title, or is
not upon a public street, an expropriation action which destroys
this access is not a "taking" or "damaging" of "property" which
entitles the landowner to compensation.
125
The problem is more difficult if access to land is by way of
a discontinuous apparent passage established by destination.
The Civil Code provides that, "If the owner of two estates, be-
tween which there exists an apparent sign of servitude, sells one
of those estates, and if the deed of sale be silent respecting the
servitude, the same shall continue to exist actively or passively
in favor of or upon the estate which has been sold.' 1 26 There is
no requirement in the article that such a servitude be continu-
120. Brockett v. Shreveport, 160 La. 105, 106 So. 710 (1926); Bickham v.
Shreveport, 156 La. 648, 101 So. 8 (1924). A dam was built which so inter-
ferred with the servitude of drain that the dominant estate was permanently
covered with water. The land had to be expropriated.
121. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 709 (1870) : "The use and extent of servitudes thus
established are regulated by the title by which they are granted, and if there be
no titles, by the following rules."
122. Boudreaux v. Landry, 120 So.2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
123. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 727 (1870): "Servitudes are either continuous or
discontinuous. Discontinuous servitudes are such as need an act of man to be
exercised. Such are the rights of passage, or drawing water, pasture and the
like."
124. Id. art. 766: "Continuous nonapparent servitudes, and discontinuous
servitudes, whether apparent or not, can be established only by title. Immemorial
possession itself is not sufficient to acquire them."
125. This results because access to a tract of land not established by a servi-
tude is not one of the real rights in property. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963), for an enumeration
and discussion of the real rights recognized in Louisiana. Since no real right
is damaged when access to land is destroyed, the landowner property rights have
not been "damaged" or "taken," and he is entitled to no compensation. The one
exception to this occurs when the access is upon a public street. The jurisprudence
has established that the means of access from land to a public street is a "prop-
erty" right. See text at notes 77-81 supra. See also Buras Ice Factory, Inc. v.
Department of Highways, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d 74 (1958).
126. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 769 (1870).
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ous. However, "The destination made by the owner is equiva-
lent to title with respect to continuous apparent servitudes.
' '
"
s7
There has been much debate in France whether a discontinuous
servitude may be established by destination.128 However, Lou-
isiana jurisprudence has failed to recognize the discrepancy ex-
isting between the two articles. In the Buras case, involving a
discontinuous apparent passage in the form of a canal from the
ice factory of the plaintiff to the Gulf of Mexico, established
by destination of the owner of the land, the Supreme Court did
not give effect to article 769.129 The court declared that because
a discontinuous apparent servitude of passage can only be estab-
lished by title, any interference with such a passage, not estab-
lished by title, is not a "damaging" of property which entitles
the owner of land depending on the passage to compensation
under article I, section 2.130 This result has been criticized as
having read article 769 out of the Civil Code.
113
Once the condemnor has successfully expropriated a servi-
tude, it becomes the condemnor's property and compensation
must be paid before it can subsequently be taken or damaged
for public purposes by another condemnor, even though it is al-
ready being used for public purposes. 13 2  However, since the
servitude is limited strictly to the purpose for which it was first
expropriated, there may be a concurrent use of the servitude by
another condemnor. If so, the first condemnor is entitled to
damages to the extent that the value of the servitude has been
decreased for his purposes. 33 When there is no interference
with the first condemnor's use of the servitude, he will receive
no compensation." 4 In these instances, the owner of the land
127. Id. art. 767.
128. See Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 560 (1948).
129. Burns Ice Factory, Inc. v. Department of Highways, 235 La. 158, 103
So.2d 74 (1957).
130. Ibid.
131. See Legislative Symposium: The 1958 Regular Session-Civil Code and
Related Subjects: Part 11, 19 LA. L. REV. 306 (1959).
132. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Department of Highways, 142 So. 2d 807
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of High-
ways, 104 So.2d 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
133. Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 166 So. 471 (1936)
Shreveport v. Texas & P. Ry., 182 La. 36, 161 So. 12 (1935) ; Shreveport v.
Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 169 La. 1085, 126 So. 667 (1930) ; Eunice v. Lou-
isiana W. Ry., 135 La. 882, 66 So. 257 (1914).
134. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. East End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66
So. 2d 327 (1953) ; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 184 La. 473, 166
So. 471 (1936) ; Shreveport v. Texas & Pac. R.R., 182 La. 36, 161 So. 12 (1935)
Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 169 La. 1085, 126 So. 667 (1930)
Eunice v. Louisiana W. Ry., 135 La. 882, 66 So. 257 (1914) ; 2 NICHOLS,
EMIE NT DoMAIN § 5.4[1] (3d ed. 1950).
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also is entitled to compensation for the taking of the second
servitude. 13
Private roads, open only for the benefit of certain individ-
uals to go to and from their homes and for the service of their
lands, are servitudes. 136 If such a road is destroyed by expro-
priation, its users should be entitled to compensation. 18 7 If a
landowner purchases a private road, and the road is subsequent-
ly expropriated, the landowner is entitled to the value of the
land taken plus a sum for the road itself.18
Damages by obstruction of light, air, and view are compen-
sable,139 but only if they cause a decrease in the value of the
property.140 The amount of compensation will be fixed at the
difference between the value of the property immediately before
and immediately after the expropriation action.' 4'
Mineral Rights
There are three types of mineral rights in Louisiana: the
mineral servitude, the mineral lease, and the mineral royalty.
The mineral servitude is a real right. Real rights being "the
rights of ownership and its recognized dismemberments, "142
the expropriation of a tract of land in full ownership gives the
state all real rights in the land,' 43 including the mineral servi-
tude. Therefore, the owner of a mineral servitude which has
been destroyed or damaged should be entitled to compensation.
135. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. East End Realty Co., 223 La. 532, 66 So. 2d 327
(1953) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955).
136. LA. CIWv CODE art. 706 (1870).
137. Since such a road is established as a servitude in article 706 of the
Civil Code, the road is a real right, and "damaging" or "taking" of it should
therefore result in compensation. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963) for a discussion of real rights
in Louisiana.
138. Police Jury v. Borne, 198 La. 959, 5 So. 2d 301 (1941). In addition to
the value of the servitude acquired, plaintiffs were allowed the value of the pri-
vate road.
139. Harrison v. Highway Comm'n, 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942) ; Carter
v. Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
140. Damages to be compensable must be damages to property. See McMahon
v. St. Louis Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Carter v.
Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
141. This is the general method used in computing damages resulting in
diminution in value of land. See Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85
So.2d 260 (1955).
142. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, Part II,
23 LA. L. REV. 518, 549 (1963).
143. See Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939).
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Although mineral leases are classified as both personal rights
and real rights, the Supreme Court has indicated that for pur-
poses of expropriation they will be treated as real rights.1 44
Therefore, damage of this right by expropriation entitles the
owner of the right to compensation. 145
The status of the mineral royalty is not entirely clear, but it
is apparently classified as a sui generis real right because it is
a charge on the land or an incorporeal immovable attached to
the land- a mineral lease, or mineral servitude . 46 For pur-
poses of expropriation, therefore, the mineral royalty should be
treated the same as a mineral servitude or mineral lease.
If property is acquired by the United States or by Louisiana,
the mineral rights therein may be reserved, and once reserved,
are imprescriptible.147 Therefore, expropriation of land by the
state allows the landowner to reserve the mineral rights in the
land, in which case they would not be "taken" or "damaged." It
seems that a conventional reservation of mineral rights when
property is expropriated by a condemnor other than the state
is possible. In that case the mineral reservation should be sub-
ject to the normal ten-year prescription rules.
Mortgages
If full ownership of property is acquired by expropriation,
it passes to the condemnor free and clear of all mortgages or
privileges of any kind. 48 The compensation, which is paid into
court, is distributed to the mortgagee and other privileged cred-
itors according to their priority.
49
If full ownership of the property is not acquired by the con-
demnor, the expropriation may still impair the mortgagee's
security. In such case the same rules that would apply in any
other impairment situation should apply to determine the mort-
gagee's rights.5 0
144. Department of Highways v. Guidry, 240 La. 516, 124 So. 2d 531 (1960).
145. Ibid.
146. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23
LA. L. REV. 161 (1963).
147 LA. R.S. 9:5806 (1950). For a review of the jurisprudence associated
with this statute see, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1961-
1962 Term - Mineral Rights, 23 LA. L. REV. 323 (1963).
148. Id. 19:11.
149. Ibid.
150. 2 NiCHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIrN § 5.741[2] (3d ed. 1950).
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Usufruct
A French statute'5 ' provides that when immovable property
subject to a usufruct is expropriated for the public utility, "the
usufructuary's right is transferred from the thing to the
award."'152 The entire amount awarded as compensation in the
expropriation proceeding is turned over to the usufructuary so
that he may enjoy it instead of the expropriated property. How-
ever, as the naked owner's risks are thereby increased, the usu-
fructuary must give security, even if he was previously exempt-
ed from doing so.153
In Louisiana the effect of expropriation on usufructs has
been litigated only once. In Department of Highways v. Cos-
tello, ' 4 the surviving spouse owned the statutory usufruct on
the deceased's share of the community. 55 The naked owners
contended that the usufruct expired when the land subject to
it was lost. Reasoning that the statutory usufruct was created
to insure the surviving spouse of means of support, 56 the court
held that the usufruct did not expire and gave the usufructuary
the entire expropriation award. This case which implies that
only the surviving spouse or usufructuary would receive the
compensation adopts a narrower rule than the French rule which
applies to all the usufructs.
"Damaging" of Personal Rights
Predial Leases
When property subject to a lease is taken for public pur-
poses, the lease terminates; and the lessee is not entitled to dam-
ages from the lessor.'5 " However, the lessee is entitled to receive
the value of his lease in the expropriation proceeding, 5 8 al-
though leases are classified as personal rights in Louisiana. 15
151. Law of May 3, 1841, art. 39.
152. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY TH
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2844 (1959).
153. Ibid.
154. Department of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963).
155. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870) is the source of the usufruct.
156. Department of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
157. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2697 (1870).
158. Department of Highways v. Schnitt, 238 La. 1069, 117 So. 2d 595
(1960) ; Department of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955).
159. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 23
LA. L. REv. 161 (1963).
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Allowance of compensation for leases in Louisiana probably re-
sulted from the fact that in Anglo-American law a lease is clas-
sified as an estate in the land, and the lessee is entitled to re-
ceive compensation upon its destruction just as the owner of any
other estate.160 Since the lessee in other jurisdictions received
compensation, Louisiana probably felt obliged to follow.
The lessee's share of the expropriation price is measured by
the market value of the lease minus the rent owed by the lessee
for the remainder of the term.'6 ' Thus, if the market value of
the lease at the time of expropriation is no more than the rent
due in the future, the lease has no value for expropriation pur-
poses. However, if the market value of the lease exceeds the
future rent due, the lessee is entitled to the excess as compensa-
tion for the lease. The profits which would have been derived
from the lease cannot be used as a basis in determining the
value of the lease. 162
As part of the lease agreement, a lessee may build a struc-
ture on the leased property. Where the terms of the lease pro-
vide that the structure shall become the property of the lessor
upon the termination of the lease, the lessee should receive the
value of the structure to the extent of its value to him. This
value should be the difference between the market value of a
lease upon the land with the structure minus the future pay-
ments the lessee would have paid under the lease. The lessor
should be entitled to receive compensation for the value of the
structure to him, which would be the value of the building to a
full owner at the future date when the lease would have ter-
minated.
If the terms of the lease provide that the lessee shall retain
ownership of the structure upon termination of the lease, the
lessee should be compensated for the value of the structure at
the time of expropriation, minus the cost of moving the struc-
ture. The cost of moving the structure should be subtracted
from the value of the structure because the lessee would have
had to bear this expense at the termination of the lease. The
lessor should have no compensable interest in the structure.
If the condemnor's acquisition of only part of the leased
160 2 NicHOLS, EMINE1NT DOmAIN § 5.23 (3d ed. 1950).
161. Department of Highways v. Schnitt, 238 La. 1069, 117 So. 2d 595
(1960) ; Department of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955).
162. See note 161 aupra.
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premises does not make the property unusable for purposes of
the lease, the lease should not terminate.'6 If the taking inter-
feres with the lease, but the lessee can continue without trouble,
the lessee should receive the difference between what he will
pay for the lease and the diminished market value of the lease.
Business Losses
Business losses resulting from expropriation proceedings are
not compensable. 164 Compensation is refused on the principle
that business losses are not property losses but personal depri-
vations, and that only damages to property are compensable
under article I, section 2.165
Business losses include the costs of moving the business, loss
of anticipated profits while moving and re-establishing the busi-
ness, and good will.16  However, if the business itself is the
thing expropriated, its good will is a compensable item.167 Al-
though business losses are not compensable, the fact that a cer-
tain type of business can be conducted on the land is relevant
in determining what is the property's highest and best use.6 8
Compensating business losses in expropriation proceedings
is entirely a manner of policy.169 Criticism of the present policy
has been directed primarily at the fact that business losses suf-
fered in expropriation proceedings are often more severe than
other compensable losses.170 At the same time the present policy
has been justified on the basis that any allowance of business
163. The situation contemplated is that in which a servitude of right of way
or passage is taken across a part of the leased property, which does not interfere
with the lessee's use of the premises. For example, expropriation of a servitude
across the back of the leased premises for purposes of laying a telephone cable
or gas line normally does not interfere with the lessee's use of the leased premises.
See Garber v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 146 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
164. Department of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So. 2d 35 (1962)
Department of Highways v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So. 2d 97 (1958) ; School Bd.
v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957) ; Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La.
463, 8 So. 2d 295 (1942) ; Shreveport v. Kansas City So. Ry., 193 La. 277, 190
So. 404 (1939); McMahon & Perrin v. St. Louis, Arkansas & Texas R.R., 41
La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Sholars v. Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 153
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
165. See note 164 supra.
166. School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957).
167. 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.76 (3d ed. 1950).
168. Department of Highways v. Crockett, 151 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
169. There is no U.S. CONST. amend. XIV problem involved because an estab-
lished business has never been held to be "property" in the constitutional sense.
See 2 NicHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.76 (3d ed. 1950).
170. See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment:
Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
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losses would lead to countless claims, all of which would be dif-
ficult to appraise. 1 7 1 One's business could be included within the
definition of "property" in article I, section 2, without theoret-
ical difficulty. If there is increased criticism of the present pol-
icy, the policy only need be changed, not the basic concepts of
"damage" and "property."
Personal Inconveniences
Damages personal to the owner which do not affect the mar-
ket value of the property are not compensable items under the
expropriation laws. 172 Such damages include mental suffering,1 8
inconvenience, 1 4 unless such inconvenience diminishes the mar-
ket value of the land not taken ;175 discomfort due to proximity
to the public improvement;176 loss of esthetic value, unless it
diminishes the value of the property ;177 moving costs ;178 and any
other inconveniences which are strictly personal and not con-
nected with the property. 7 9
Conclusion
Constitutional clauses, requiring compensation for the tak-
ing of property for public purposes, are found in every state
constitution. These clauses have been expanded through the
years to protect individual interests against the power of the
state to take property for public purposes. For example, until
1870 "damages" resulting from expropriation proceedings were
not compensable. In that year the State of Illinois extended the
171. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.76 (3d ed. 1950).
172. McMahon & Perrin v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6
So. 640 (1889).
173. DeBouchel v. Highway Comm'n, 172 La. 908, 135 So. 914 (1931) ; Nagle
v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
174. Efurd v. Shreveport, 235 La. 555, 105 So. 2d 219 (1958) ; Rudolph Ra-
melli, Inc. v. New Orleans, 233 La. 291, 96 So. 2d 572 (1957) ; Police Jury v.
Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So. 2d 672 (1957) ; Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219
La. 740, 54 So. 2d 4 (1951) ; Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So. 2d
295 (1942) ; Highway Comm'n v. Boudreaux, 19 La. App. 98, 139 So. 521 (1932).
175. Highway Comm'n v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933) ; Opelousas,
Gulf & N.E. Ry. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 121 La. 796, 46 So. 810 (1908).
176. New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So. 2d 349 (1959).
177. Ibid.; E. Baton Rouge v. Koller, 94 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, 79 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
178. School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So. 2d 40 (1957) ; Department of
Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955) ; Housing Authority v.
Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So. 2d 295 (1942).
179. Department of Highways v. Circle Center Corp., 148 So. 2d 411 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962). Request for damages for preparation of new plat plans,
renderings, brochures, models, and other papers required by the shifting and re-
arranging of prospective buildings was denied.
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protection afforded by their constitution to include "dam-
ages." 180 Louisiana, the tenth state to follow the example of Illi-
nois, included the term "damages" within its constitutional
clause in 1879. As the need arose, the concept of "damages" has
been further expanded.
This development emphasizes the ability of the courts to
recognize the need for protection of individual interests as so-
ciety grows more complex and the necessity of new public im-
provements increases. The necessity of new public improve-
ments is obvious, but they should not be constructed at the cost
of an individual. However, all individual loss cannot be com-
pensated because it would render the costs of public improve-
ments prohibitive. Therefore, the legislature and courts must
determine when losses are oppressive and thus should be com-
pensable. The concepts of "property," "taken," and "damages"
in article I, section 2, allow the court and legislature sufficient
discretion to accomplish this objective.
Marsden W. Miller, Jr.
180. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.44 (3d ed. 1950).
1964]
